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Abstract
CAPTCHA systems have been widely deployed to identify
and block fraudulent bot traffic. However, current solutions,
such as Google’s reCAPTCHA, often either (i) require addi-
tional user actions (e.g., users solving mathematical or image-
based puzzles), or (ii) need to send the attestation data back
to the server (e.g., user behavioral data, device fingerprints,
etc.), thus raising significant privacy concerns.
To address both of the above, in this paper we present
ZKSENSE: the first zero knowledge proof-based bot detec-
tion system, specifically designed for mobile devices. Our
approach is completely transparent to the users and does not
reveal any sensitive sensor data to the service provider. To
achieve this, ZKSENSE studies the mobile device’s motion
sensor outputs during user actions and assess their humanness
locally with the use of an ML-based classifier trained by us-
ing sensor data from public sources and data collected from a
small set of volunteers.
We implement a proof of concept of our system as an An-
droid service to demonstrate its feasibility and effectiveness.
In our evaluation we show that ZKSENSE detects bots with-
out degrading the end-user experience or jeopardizing their
privacy, with 91% accuracy across a variety of bot scenarios,
including: (i) when the device is resting (e.g., on a table), (ii)
when there is artificial movement from the device’s vibration,
and (iii) when the device is docked on a swinging cradle.
1 Introduction
Bot fraud, perpetrated by automated software agents that in-
teract with content in a human-like way, is becoming more
prevalent and pernicious the recent years. A recent study [89]
reveals that companies were hit by 3 billion automated bot
attacks in the last six months of 2018. In the ad market specif-
ically, the ever-evolving bot-related fraud currently costs
companies between $6.5 billion and $19 billion in the U.S.
alone and it is estimated that this will grow to $50 billion
by 2025 [64]. In 2013, the Chameleon botnet alone was har-
vesting around 6 million dollars/month from advertisers [76].
The wide deployment of ad blockers on desktop browsers
and the continuous shift to mobile devices and apps [30],
created opportunities for fraudsters to earn high profits by
abusing the in-app ad ecosystem and exploiting low-cost mo-
bile devices. Numerous click farms with rows upon rows of
zombie phone armies make money by simulating clicks, touch
events, and views on ads [61] that nobody actually watches.
A recent study [88] using data spanning 17 billion transac-
tions (2018), observes 189 million bot attacks originated from
mobile devices; this is an increase of 12% compared to the
previous six months.
The current state-of-the-art mechanism to mitigate such
attacks is the Completely Automated Public Turing tests
to tell Computers and Humans Apart (or just CAPTCHA).
CAPTCHA systems have been widely deployed across the
web to identify and block fraudulent bot traffic. How-
ever, aside from the questionable accuracy of such sys-
tems [11, 70, 83, 97], current implementations (e.g., Securim-
age [74], hCaptcha [56]) either require additional user actions
(e.g., image, audio, math, or textual challenges), which sig-
nificantly impoverish the users’ experience [32] especially
on mobile devices. Another way to assess the humanness of
the user is to track their behavior and centralize the collected
information to infer its nature (i.e., human or bot related). To
this extent, systems such as invisible reCAPTCHA [60], have
raised significant privacy concerns [2, 22, 81].
Our approach: To address both of the challenges above, in
this paper, we present ZKSENSE: a novel privacy-preserving
mechanism for bot detection in mobile devices. ZKSENSE
leverages motion sensors, such as the gyroscope and ac-
celerometer, to sense device’s motion triggered by user’s inter-
actions with an app. Contrary to similar approaches [46, 53],
that require user to perform specific actions (i.e., tilt the
device), ZKSENSE is completely friction-less, thus requir-
ing zero additional involvement from the user. The goal of
ZKSENSE is to infer whether a specific performed action
(e.g., click/type/touch event) was carried out by a human or
a bot, even when there are artificial device movements (i.e.,
mobile device is placed on a swinging cradle [98]).
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
07
64
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
8 N
ov
 20
19
Contrary to the state-of-the-art, (i.e., invisible re-
CAPTCHA) where raw data is transferred to a remote server
that performs the classification, in ZKSENSE we perform the
classification locally, on the user’s device, and transmit only
the final result (i.e., bot or human) to the server. This way, not
a single bit of potentially sensitive data leaves the user device,
thus preserving the user privacy. To verify the validity of the
result ZKSENSE uses zero knowledge (ZK) proofs [36].
Contributions: In this paper, we make the following main
contributions:
1. We design ZKSENSE: a sensor-based and context-
aware bot detection system that attests the humanness
of the performed actions on a mobile device without
adding any friction to the user experience. ZKSENSE
uses a ML-model to detect if an action was triggered by
a bot or a human by studying the output of the mobile
device’s motion sensors during the particular action (e.g.,
click). To train our model we use publicly available sen-
sor traces for setting the ground truth. In addition, we
instrument Brave browser for Android and capture both
user clicks and sensor traces from a small set real users.
Our approach is tested under various bot scenarios: (i)
when device is resting (on a table), (ii) when there is
artificial movement from device’s vibration, (iii) when
the device is docked on a artificial movement generating
swinging cradle.
2. To protect the users privacy, in ZKSENSE we per-
form the detection on the user side and we leverage
non-interactive zero knowledge proofs to ensure the in-
tegrity of the detection result, while reporting back to
a remote auditor. We implement a library for enclos-
ing results of SVM (Support-Vector Machine) classi-
fiers in zero-knowledge proofs. Our library is based
on ZoKrates [102], which leverages ZK-SNARKs [44].
3. By leveraging the above library, we implement an
Android app to showcase the detection accuracy of
ZKSENSE (see demo video in [99]). Our prototype
is using the accelerometer and gyroscope to attest the
humanness of a touch-screen event on the mobile de-
vice. The attestation takes place in the background,
asynchronously, so it does not affect the user experience
and the result of the classification is transmitted to a re-
mote server along with ZK proofs. Our system is able
to detect if an action was triggered by a bot or a human
with 91% accuracy.
2 Background on Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Data integrity and privacy, as well as trusted computation,
are some of the key challenges in data-driven environments.
Whenever parties exchange data, they are exposed to a po-
tential data breach. In addition, the data receiver must verify
the integrity of the transmitted data. These challenges are
the main motivation behind the design of zero-knowledge
proofs (ZKPs) and verifiable privacy-enhancing technology.
2.1 Interactive Zero Knowledge Proofs
Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) were introduced in the 1980s
by Goldwasser et al. [35]. Authors presented an interactive
cryptographic algorithm to enable one party (a prover) to
convince an other party (a verifier) about the validity of a
certain statement. The statement being proved must include
the assertion that the prover has such knowledge, without
revealing any other information about the knowledge itself.
During this interaction the verifier learns nothing but whether
the statement is true or not.
Interactive zero-knowledge proofs require interaction be-
tween (a) the party proving their knowledge and (b) the party
validating the proof. Interactive ZKPs must satisfy the prop-
erties of (i) completeness: if the statement is true, the honest
verifier will be convinced of this fact by an honest prover
(ii) soundness: if the statement is false, the probability for a
cheating prover to convince an honest verifier that it is true
is practically negligible. (iii) zero-knowledge: if the state-
ment is true, verifier learns nothing more than the fact that
the statement is true.
2.2 Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Proofs
Blum et al. [10] introduced the non-interactive Zero Knowl-
edge Proofs (NIZKPs), which enables the prover to prove the
validity of a statement without interacting with the verifier.
The prover simply sends one message to the verifier, and the
verifier either accepts or rejects. Both the prover and verifier
have access to a random public string trusted to be random
by both. NIZKPs enjoy a growing popularity and adoption in
the blockchain era, used mostly for decentralization, verifia-
bility and accountability on anonymous blockchain technolo-
gies [8, 15, 91].
The need for a reduced size and lightweight verification
procedure (ideal for blockchain based applications) pushed
for numerous improvements in the past years [12, 33, 43, 73].
This progress resulted in several proposed schemes such as
ZK-SNARKs [44], ZK-STARKs [7] or Bulletproofs [17] (see
Figure 1) that became the backbone of various real-world
applications: e.g., privacy-protecting digital currencies [50],
anonymous verifiable voting [42], distributed ledgers that
provide private transactions and contracts [23], accountability-
providing distributed VPN systems [92].
ZK-SNARKs: Specifically, a Zero Knowledge Succinct
Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (ZK-SNARKs)
enables the prover to generate a NIZKP of constant size of
any NP-statement. This makes it a useful tool not only for
blockchain-based applications, but for any scenario that a
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Scheme Proving Verification Proof Size
Time Time
ZK-SNARKs [44] n log(n) l 1
ZK-STARKs [7] n polylog(n) polylog(n) polylog(n)
Bulletproofs [17] n log(n) n log(n) log(n)
Figure 1: Comparison of proposed proof schema, where l is
the number of inputs and n the length of the circuit represent-
ing the computation to be proven.
party wants to prove the knowledge of a solution to an NP-
problem, while maintaining small size proofs and low ver-
ification computation time. However succinctness in ZK-
SNARKs comes at the cost of high proving computational
effort and the need of a pre-existing trusted setup.
The trusted setup generates a set of public parameters used
to construct and verify proofs1. Note, however, that trust is
only required by verifiers and in our case, there is only one ver-
ifying entity, the service provider. Thus, the latter can be the
entity which generates the public parameters without neither
harming the integrity of the scheme nor requiring complex
multi-party protocols such as the ones used by Zerocash [8]
and in AZTEC Ignition ceremony [75].
ZK-STARKs: A relatively new alternative of ZK-SNARKs
are the zero knowledge Scalable Transparent ARguments of
Knowledge (ZK-STARKs) [7]. ZK-STARKs are relatively
more proving-time efficient NIZKPs and are constructed un-
der post-quantum cryptographic assumptions, as opposed to
ZK-SNARKs which are prone to attack by quantum comput-
ers. Moreover, ZK-STARKs remove the need of a trusted
setup in exchange of a poly-logarithmic growth (with respect
to the size of the circuit representing the computation to be
proven) in the size and verification time of the proof. Con-
trarily, ZK-SNARKs have a constant size in the proof size, as
shown in Figure 1. Other proposals that do not require trusted
setups include Bulletproofs [17] or Supersonic [18].
2.3 ZKSENSE on top of ZK-SNARKs
In ZKSENSE, the bot detection component, running on the
user device, provides verifiable results to a remote auditor by
reporting NIZKPs together with the result. This way, the audi-
tor can be certain of the integrity and privacy of the computa-
tion. To generate such zero-knowledge proofs we leverage the
ZoKrates toolbox. ZoKrates uses the Rust implementation of
the Bellman library [84] of ZK-SNARKs2.
While ZK-SNARKs have made significant headway to
being a well-established and adopted protocol, ZK-STARKs
are recently being touted as their improved version when it
1A malicious entity, which knows how these parameters were generated,
would be able to create proofs about false statements.
2The Bellman library is the core of the Sapling protocol of Zcash [51].
comes to computation time on the prover side as seen in
Figure 1. Utilizing ZK-STARKs in ZKSENSE would reduce
the prover computational overhead (as measured in Section 6).
However, the large size of the generated proofs (see Figure 1)
and the lack of mature and well-maintained ZK-STARKs
libraries3 made us choose to build our prototype on top of
ZK-SNARKs and ZoKrates.
3 Motivation
In this section, we present the threat model of our work as
well as some of the basic design principles that a humanness
verification mechanism must have in order to constitute a
successful solution for the bot detection problem.
3.1 Key Design Principles
In this paper, we believe that a successful contribution to
the problem of distinguishing bot activity in mobile devices
should have the following basic characteristics, around which
we build our approach:
1. Be friction-less: Many existing commercial mechanisms
require from the user to solve mathematical quizzes or
image and audio challenges [56,74], thus severely hamper-
ing the user experience. Indeed, according to studies [3]:
(i) humans will only agree on what the CAPTCHA says
71% of the time, (ii) visual CAPTCHAs take 9.8 seconds
to complete, while Audio CAPTCHAs take 28.4 seconds
(and 50% of the Audio CAPTCHA users will quit). Other
related research works [46] reduce the user friction by
requiring from user to tilt phone during the humanness
verification procedure in order to retrieve proper input
from motion sensors. Similar to their follow up paper [45],
in ZKSENSE, we detect bot behavior based on the device
movements that happen during user actions (e.g., typing,
clicking).
2. Be privacy-preserving: To avoid harming the user
experience, mechanisms like Google’s Invisible re-
CAPTCHA [60] track the user while they browse the
web. Specifically, website administrators have to embed
the Invisible reCAPTCHA code on all of the pages of
their website so: (i) the visitor’s behavior is tracked, (ii)
the produced data are sent to Google servers, (iii) the risk
scores are computed and finally, (iv) they are shared with
the website’s administrator. Of course, this pervasive be-
havioral tracking raises significant concerns regarding its
implications on the user privacy [22, 81]. In ZKSENSE,
and unlike similar sensor-based approaches [45, 46, 53],
we decouple the bot detection process from the remote
auditor. Instead, the anomaly detection is happening on
3The popular ZK-STARKs library AirScript [31] is much less mature
project than the existing ZK-SNARKs toolboxes (e.g., ZoKrates [102] or
Snarky [69]).
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1Human triggered click Bot triggered click
Figure 2: Output of motion sensors during bot and human triggered click (red). The maximum linear acceleration movement is
up to 8.5× greater and the angular rotational velocity is up to 4.9× greater in case of a human triggered click.
3
Bot click during vibration Bot click during swing motion
Figure 3: Output of motion sensors during bot triggered click with artificial device movement (red): (i) bot triggered click during
device vibration (on the left) and (ii) bot triggered click when device is docked on a swing (on the right).
the user side and the remote auditor learns only the result
of this process via ZK proofs that guarantee the integrity
of the detection process.
3. Assume that detection code can be tampered: One way
to implement user-side bot detection, and ensure the in-
tegrity of the result, is to run the corresponding code from
within a secure enclave of a Trusted Execution Environ-
ment (TEE). Indeed, there are several proposals [58] rely-
ing on such hardware support like ARM’s TrustZone [5],
Apple’s Secure Enclave [4], Samsung’s KNOX [79] or
Intel’s SGX [55]. By design such architectures allow ar-
bitrary code to run within the trusted hardware, however,
these TEEs are not widely available on mobile devices,
especially low-end ones at the moment. It is apparent
thus, that such an approach would have limited applica-
bility nowadays. Hence, in ZKSENSE, we assume that
attacker can tamper with the user-side running classifier
and therefore the integrity of the classifier’s model needs
to be verified on every humanness verification procedure.
3.2 Threat Model
In this paper, we assume an attacker who controls an arbi-
trary number of mobile devices, which are part of a well-
instrumented botnet. Through this botnet, the attacker per-
forms automated actions to imitate a legitimate user (i.e., view
ads, perform ad clicks) for monetary gain. This monetary gain
can be achieved either (i) indirectly: website owners pay the
attacker to get a number of ad clicks and thus increase the
revenues they get from a pay-per-click (PPC) ad model, or (ii)
directly: attacker registers for reward schemes (e.g., Brave’s
Ad Rewards [14]) via multiple accounts, which imitate user
activity to claim the rewards. Such an attacker can:
1. Compromise the device’s operating system.
2. Modify the applications code.
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Figure 4: High-level overview of the ZKSENSE architecture. An integrated ML-based classifier studies the patterns of sensor
outputs right before, during, and shortly after a click event. To avoid leaking sensitive sensor output outside the device, the
classification appears on the user side and the client has to prove the integrity of the reported result to the external auditor.
3. Run the applications in an emulator.
4. Provide fake sensor outputs.
5. Reverse-engineer code of deployed countermeasures.
Assumptions: Throughout the rest of this paper, by user ac-
tivity, we assume clicking via screen touching. Of course,
such activity can also include key typing, mouse hovering, or
scrolling. In addition, we assume an untrusted mobile device
equipped with trusted hardware capable of hashing and sign-
ing motion sensor output similar to what is already used in
this research area [34, 45, 59].
4 Our Approach: ZKSENSE
In this section, we present the design of our approach. We be-
gin with a straw-man approach and step-by-step, we describe
how we are able to detect fraudulent bot activity without
harming the privacy of the user.
4.1 System Overview
By monitoring the output of device’s sensors during human
and bot activity it is easy to anticipate that whenever a human
user performs a click on the mobile’s display, the force applied
during the touch event generates motion. This motion is be
captured by the embedded IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit)
sensors (e.g., accelerometer and gyroscope). By contrast,
fraudulent bots use software simulated touches to fulfil their
task. Since there is no external force exerted by fingers, there
is no noticeable change in the sensor outputs.
In Figure 2, we present a snapshot of how the output of
the sensors look like during a click event when this is per-
formed (i) by a bot and (ii) by a human. As one can observe,
the maximum linear acceleration movement is up to 8.5×
greater in case of human click (i.e., accelerometer senses a
max rate of change of 0.6 in case of human and 0.07 in case
of bot). Similarly, the maximum angular rotational velocity
is up to 4.9× greater in case of a human click (i.e., gyroscope
in absolute numbers senses a max rate of change of 0.024 in
case of human click and 0.0049 in case of bot).
In Figure 3, we present a snapshot of the same sensors’
output in the case of a bot click during artificial device move-
ment. We see that the motion generated is comparable with
the case of the human click depicted in Figure 2. Specifically,
(i) on the left, we present the sensors’ output in case of a bot
click during vibration. We see that the accelerometer senses
the same force with the case of the human click4 but for a
longer period. The gyroscope though senses greater angular
rotational velocity and for longer period than in the case of
a human’s click. On the right, (ii) we present the sensors’
output when there is a bot triggered click and the device is
docked on a swing. As one can observe, when the gyroscope
senses similar angular rotational velocity with the case of the
human click, the accelerometer senses for a long period (up
to 3.8×) greater linear acceleration movement in the case of
a bot triggered click.
Building upon these observations, ZKSENSE uses an ML-
based classifier to study the pattern of sensor outputs before,
during, and shortly after a click event. Based on this informa-
tion, the model decides about whether the action was triggered
by a human or not. In Figure 4, we present a basic overview
of our system.
4.1.1 Preserving the user privacy
In existing approaches like Google’s ReCAPTCHA classifiers
like above are deployed in a centralized way, on the server,
while the app is responsible for collecting IMU sensor data
and sending them back to the server as input for the classifier.
However, studies [25,62,72,77,80,100] have shown that IMU
sensor data is sensitive: it may reveal keystrokes, gender, age,
and can be used to fingerprint users.
4This verifies the observations of a previous study [45].
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Data Volume
Volunteering Users 6 users
Duration of data collection 22 days
Android Devices tested Google Pixel 3, OnePlus 6,
Huawei Mate 20 Lite and
Samsung Galaxy S9/S8/S6
Human events collected 7,736 clicks
Bot events collected 25,921 clicks
Figure 5: Summary of the collected dataset.
Privacy-preserving evaluation of machine learning mod-
els has become increasingly important especially in the post
GDPR era. One approach to mitigate this would be to en-
crypt the data on the client and send them to the server for
classification. This can be achieved using Homomorphic
Encryption [13, 29, 41]. However, the scalability of such ap-
proach for services with many clients is fairly limited. Indeed,
each client would need to encrypt their data with their own
key and send the ciphertext to the server who evaluates the
model over the encrypted data. Then the server would need
to send the outcome of the homomorphic computation back
to the user who would provably decrypt it and send it back to
the server. It is easy to anticipate that the overhead to perform
such multi-step operation for each client is unbearable for
services with millions of clients.
In ZKSENSE, we move the classifier to the edge by run-
ning it on the user side and report only the result to the remote
server (auditor). As a result, ZKSENSE ensures that no sen-
sor data that could harm the user privacy can leave the device.
In Figure 4, we present the high level overview of our ap-
proach. As we can see, each click event triggers a humanness
attestation procedure where the motion sensor outputs are
feeding the Humanness Prover module, which runs a trained
model to classify if the action was conducted by a human or a
bot based on the sensor input. The result of this classification
is transmitted to a remote auditor, which acts accordingly
based on that e.g., if the click was performed by a bot the
requested web transaction will get declined.
4.2 Bot Classification
4.2.1 Data Collection
To collect the necessary ground truth to train the various tested
models, we instrumented the open source browser Brave 5
for Android to capture click events (and their corresponding
motion sensor traces) performed during browsing. Then, we
recruited a small number of 6 volunteering students (6 de-
vices) that used our instrumented browser for 22 consecutive
days for their daily browsing. The device models used include:
5https://github.com/brave/brave-browser
Bot Detection
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We divide each click event into two segments:
Pressing Down Releasing Up
Figure 6: The period of a click event starts 50ms before the
beginning of the action and ends 250ms after the end of it.
Google Pixel 3, Samsung Galaxy S9, S8 and S6, OnePlus 6,
and Huawei Mate 20 Lite. Volunteers were well-informed
about the purpose of this study and gave us consent to col-
lect and analyse the motion sensor traces generated during
their click events. We asked volunteers to use their phone as
normal when using the browser to reflect reality.
To generate bot traffic, we used adb to automate software
clicks on 4 of the volunteering devices. To test different attack
scenarios, during the automation, we generate software clicks
with the device being in 4 different states:
1. while resting on a platform (desk/stand)
2. while being carried around in pocket
3. while being placed on a swing motion device
4. while device is vibrating (triggered by adb)6
As summarized in Figure 5, by the end of the data collec-
tion, we had 7,736 human generated clicks and 25,921 bot
generated clicks.
4.2.2 Feature Selection
During our data collection, accelerometer and gyroscope sen-
sors were sampled at 250Hz. For each click event, we not
only consider the device motion during the touch, but also
the device motion right before and shortly after the touch. In
particular, we consider the period starting at 50ms before the
click event and ends at 250ms after the click event. Then, we
split each period into two segments: (i) before releasing finger
and (ii) after releasing finger as depicted in Figure 6. For each
axis (x/y/z) in accelerometer and gyroscope, we calculate the
average and standard deviation of its outputs in each segment.
In addition, we calculate the consecutive difference of sensor
outputs in each segment and use the average and standard
deviation of these differences as features. As a result, we
compose a feature vector of size 48 to characterise each click
event.
6As shown in Section 4.1, device vibration and human click can produce
similar motion patterns [45].
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Figure 7: Humanness detection over zero-knowledge proofs. ZKSENSE consists of two ML evaluation proving components of
ZKSENSE: (i) Humanness Prover and (ii) Humanness Verifier. Each one of them consist of two sub-modules that ensure the
integrity of the features and the SVM model.
4.2.3 Classification Accuracy
Using the above features, we test several ML classifiers and
we perform 10-fold cross validation. Figure 8 presents the
weighted F1 score and recall of the different classifiers we
tested. We choose weighted F1 score as an evaluation index
because our dataset is unbalanced. Here, the recall means
the proportion of correctly identified bot clicks over all bot
clicks. In other words, the recall indicates the ability to cap-
ture bot clicks. In most use cases of ZKSENSE, the recall is
more important than the precision because the latter can be
compensated using a fallback CAPTCHA system. As shown
in Figure 8, the four tested classifiers (i.e., SVM, decision
tree, random forest, and neural network with ReLU kernel)
have similar performance in terms of recall (i.e., 0.95 recall).
Although, Decision Tree and Random Forest perform slighlty
better in terms of accuracy, in ZKSENSE, we utilize SVM for
compatibility purposes as stated in more detail in Section 4.3.
Hence, our system’s overall accuracy in detecting bots is 91%.
4.3 Provable and Privacy-Preserving ML
Evaluation
In Section 3.2, we assume powerful attackers that are capa-
ble of tampering with the source code of our approach. This
means that an attacker could cheat the system by replaying
sensor outputs captured during legit human click events or
tamper with the shipped model and report invalid results to
the auditor. To address that, ZKSENSE leverages ZK proofs
to perform privacy-preserving provable ML evaluation, and
ensure the integrity of the detection result reported to the au-
ditor. The limited number of existing approaches [24, 27] use
ZKP constructions with linear (with respect to the statement
to be proven) verification time. This makes such approaches
not scalable for online services with multi-million users and
complex statements to be proven like ZKSENSE. Contrary to
that, ZKSENSE uses ZK-SNARKs (see Section 2 for details),
Classifier F1 (weighted) Recall
SVM 0.91 0.95
Decision Tree (9 Layers) 0.93 0.95
Random Forest (8 Trees, 10 Layers) 0.93 0.95
KNN 0.92 0.93
Neural Network (Linear Kernel) 0.86 0.95
Neural Network (ReLU Kernel) 0.91 0.96
Figure 8: Accuracy of the various tested classifiers.
and this way achieves a scalable verification time, suitable for
services many clients.
In Figure 7, we present an overview of the two ML eval-
uation proving components of ZKSENSE: (i) Humanness
Prover and (ii) Humanness Verifier. In ZKSENSE, the Hu-
manness Prover deployed on the client, checks whether a user
is a human based on a the pre-trained model and generates a
proof to ensure its proper execution. As shown in Figure 7,
the Humanness Prover consists of two more sub-modules:
the Feature Integrity Prover and the ML Model Prover:
1. Feature Integrity Prover: This prover aims to ensure that
the data originate from the embedded IMU sensors and
the features are correctly calculated.
2. ML Model Prover: This prover checks if the ML-based
humanness detection model identifies the user as a hu-
man or a bot. The result and its proof will be stored
locally and also transmitted to the auditor’s server.
Respectively, the Humanness Verifier on the auditor’s side
contains two modules: (i) Feature Integrity Verifier and (ii)
ML Model Verifier. If the verification is successful, the auditor
will know that (a) the ML-based humanness detection model
identifies the user as a human or a bot based on the trusted
sensor outputs and that (b) the used model is the genuine one,
without though learning the value of sensor outputs.
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4.3.1 Provable ML Model
In Section 4.2, we presented the accuracy of the different
classifiers tested and we show that they provide similar accu-
racy. In ZKSENSE, we choose SVM as the underlying model
due to its simplicity at evaluation time and its suitability with
zero knowledge proofs. While decision trees, random forests,
or neural networks provide slightly higher F1 accuracy as
shown in Table 8, we consider that the trade-off is worth the
loss in precision. These models need to perform non-linear
operations (NNs) or several range proofs, which are expen-
sive operations in ZK-SNARKs. SVMs, on the other hand,
need to perform some preprocessing on the data, such as cal-
culating the average, standard deviation or normalising the
input points. In this section, we present how to deal with the
preprocessing of the data in a provable way.
Feature preprocessing proofs. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 4.2, ZKSENSE uses the average, µ, and standard devia-
tion, σ, of sensor outputs as features. Therefore, we need to
construct proofs to prove that these features are correctly cal-
culated. These operations usually result in non-integer values.
Given that ZK-SNARKs are general purpose languages, one
could implement floating point arithmetic. However, these
would result in an increase in the proving computation time.
For this purpose, we limit the number of digits of precision.
Nonetheless, when computing the average and standard de-
viation, we could still fall in non-integer values. To solve
this issue we simply use the floor of the average, µˆ, and stan-
dard deviation, µˆ, and prove that it indeed corresponds to that
value.
In particular, suppose we have a vector of integer values
v = [v1,v2, · · · ,vn] and we want to prove µˆ = bµc is the floor
of the average of v, then the computation we want to prove is
the following:
Nµˆ≤
N
∑
i=1
vi
N(µˆ+1)>
N
∑
i=1
vi
(1)
Similarly, we can prove correct calculation of the floor of the
standard deviation (σˆ):
(Nσˆ)2 ≤
N
∑
i=1
(vi− µˆ)2
(N(σˆ+1))2 >
N
∑
i=1
(vi− µˆ)2
(2)
Furthermore, in order to evaluate the SVM model, we need
to calculate the consecutive difference of sensor outputs and
their respective average and standard deviation. For the latter,
we use the above introduced operations. For the former, we
prove the simple arithmetic relation, which in this case is a
difference of two integer values.
Finally, before applying the SVM model, the extracted
features need first to be normalised. The goal of normali-
sation is to change data values to a common scale, without
distorting differences in the ranges of values. Then, trained
SVM weights will be assigned to each normalised feature to
calculate the SVM score.
In particular, suppose for each feature fi the normalisation
mean, normalisation scale, and SVM weight and intercept are
Mi, Si, wi and c respectively. Then, the SVM score s can be
calculated using the following equation:
s =
1
e−(c+∑
N
i=1
( fi−Mi)
Si
wi)+1
(3)
Since only the value of fi is secret, we only need to
prove the value of ∑Ni=1 fi
wi
Si
. To mitigate the drawback that
ZoKrates can only process integer values, we instead prove
∑Ni=1 fi
⌊
wi
Si
10d
⌋
and effectively use the parameter d to pre-
serve d-digits after the decimal points of wiSi . Since
wi
Si
is
public knowledge, the normalizing proof only requires do-
ing integer multiplication and addition and thus is relatively
trivial in ZoKrates.
5 Implementation
To assess the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach
we built and open sourced (i) a prototype of ZKSENSE for
Android and (ii) a library for enclosing classification results
in ZK proofs. In the remainder of this section, we describe
both implementation in detail.
5.1 Library for Enclosing SVM Results in a
Zero Knowledge Proof
In order to prove the integrity of the classification results
we build a library on top of ZoKrates generic-purpose ZK-
SNARKs toolbox 7. ZoKrates works as a high level abstrac-
tion for the trusted setup. It enables developers to write the
code of the proof, and it takes care of defining the correspond-
ing circuit that will be used to generate the proof. ZoKrates
constructs the ZKP by using the generated circuit with the
Rust implementation of Bellman [84], the (commonly called)
Groth16 ZK-SNARK [44].
The trusted setup of the Groth16 construction needs to be
generated for every different circuit that one wants to make a
proof of. It is then of our interest to generate a circuit general
enough to accept all touch events. This would be as simple as
defining a function that receives as input the array of sensor
outputs generated during the touch event. However, ZoKrates
7At the beginning ZoKrates was mainly designed to integrate ZK-
SNARKs in Ethereum.
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supports static arrays, i.e., their size needs to be known at
compile time. Because of that, we defined the maximum
array size to be 70 which was an upper bound for the size
of most of the touch events as defined in Section 4.2. We
padded with zeros the events shorter than 70 sensor values. In
order for these zeros not to modify the average and standard
deviation, we include as input the number of sensor values
initially generated by the touch event. Then the proof only
uses the values which are in the slice of ‘valid’ entries.
To prove that a set of values is the pre-image of a hashed
sensor value, we test the performance both with the SHA
and the Pedersen hash ZoKrates standard library implementa-
tions8 and conclude that the former was more efficient in the
proving time. The Pedersen standard library implementation
offers a 6-bit input and a 512-bit input version of the hash
function. In our library, we choose the former, which allows
us to batch more sensor output values. To be exact, given that
we use a precision of 6 decimal digits (and hence, can repre-
sent each integer with 25 bits) we batch 18 sensor outputs per
hash. Given that the gyroscope and accelerometer work in a
three dimensional space, and the static size of the array is 70,
we need to use signatures over 11 different hashes, and hence
prove knowledge of pre-image of 11 Pedersen hashes.
The generated proof is independent of the trained model,
as the weights of the SVM model are included as input. This
means that if the given model is improved or changed, one
does not need to reset the trusted setup phase, but simply
change the input values related to the SVM weights. Our
library is written in ZoKrates and it is provided open sourced.
To integrate our detection engine with ZoKrates we use An-
droid NDK: a development kit to leverage native code.
5.2 Prototype of our Approach
Next, we implement a prototype of ZKSENSE for Android,
which consists of around a thousand lines of code and it works
as a background service for different apps. Our prototype col-
lects the output of the Android’s accelerometer and gyroscope
during a touch event and, by applying a pre-trained model,
it determines if the touch event was performed by a human
finger or by a bot.
As previously discussed, we assume that the output of the
Android motion sensors is hashed and signed before being
used for evaluating the pre-trained model. The integrity of the
model and its result is guaranteed by the use of ZKPs and the
signatures over the hashed values. For the generation of the
ZKPs, we leverage the library we implemented and described
previously. The pre-trained model is generated on a server in
python. Apart from generating and distributing the trained
model, the server also acts as the external auditor that verifies
the validity of the transmitted attestation results.
8https://github.com/Zokrates/ZoKrates/tree/master/
zokrates_stdlib/stdlib/hashes
For demonstration purposes we create a toy app with a
user interface that shows the output of the detection model
and in [99] we provide publicly a video that demonstrates
its functionality. In this demo, we test multiple scenarios to
showcase the accuracy of our system:
1. When the device is resting on a steady platform and
(a) a human is performing clicks .
(b) bot clicks are simulated.
2. When the device is docked on a swing motion device
that produce artificial movement.
3. When the device is held in one hand and
(a) a human is performing clicks.
(b) bot clicks are simulated.
6 Real World Use Case of ZKSENSE
In a real-world scenario, an online service would rely on
ZKSENSE to ensure that its clients are humans and detect
potential frauds. To achieve this, ZKSENSE runs on the
user side in conjunction with the service’s mobile app (e.g.,
web browser, banking app, etc.) by importing an SDK in the
app’s code, and it periodically verifies the humanness of the
user. More specifically, each user click will have a specific
probability set by the app depending on its needs: the more
the frequent tests the higher the overhead on the user’s device
(CPU utilization, power consumption) as measured in the rest
of this section.
Similar to how Cloudflare is using Privacy Pass [26], cryp-
tographically blind tokens will be issued for the verified user
after each successful attestation. These tokens can be used
each and every time the user accesses an online service or
a website. Contrary to the Cloudflare case [85], where 30
tokens are issued for each successful solved CAPTCHA, in
our case the user does not face any degradation of their user
experience, since the entire attestation process is completely
transparent.
6.1 Performance Evaluation
As a next step we set out to explore the performance of each
humanness attestation in ZKSENSE. More specifically, we
benchmark our prototype on Android with respect to the dura-
tion of its main operations: (i) i.e., bot detection, (ii) Pedersen
hash computation, and (iii) zero knowledge proof (ZKP) con-
struction (see Section 4.1). Next, we evaluate general resource
utilization metrics: (a) CPU and (b) memory utilization, and
(c) battery consumption. Our tests cover the four different key
operations of a complete humanness attestation in ZKSENSE:
1. The baseline, where we run our toy application which
uses ZKSENSE service (see Section 5) and several bot
clicks are emulated.
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Figure 9: Execution time per operation. Regardless of the
device, bot detection is extremely fast (about 0.3 seconds).
On a S9 device, hashing takes 24 seconds while the ZKP
calculation can take up to 174.5 seconds.
2. The detection operation, where input from sensors is re-
trieved and the bot detection is happening on ZKSENSE.
3. The hashing operation where the Pedersen hash compu-
tation is taking place.
4. The ZKP operation where the ZK-SNARK is con-
structed.
We run each stage for an hour during while we ensure the
same number of bot clicks by using as an interval the duration
of the longest operation (ZKP) as empirically measured.
For our experiments, we leverage a testbed composed of
two Android devices representative of a high end (Samsung
Galaxy S9, 2018) and a low end (Samsung Galaxy J3, 2018)
device. The S9 mounts an octa-core processor (a Quad-Core
Mongoose M3 at 2.7GHz and a Quad-Core ARM Cortex-
A55 at 1.8Ghz), when the J3 is equipped with a quad-core
ARM Cortex A53 at 1.2 Ghz. The S9 also has twice as
much memory (4 GB when J3 has 2 GB) and a larger battery
(3,000 mAh when the battery of J3 is 2,600 mAh). The
low end device (J3) is part of Batterylab [6, 93]: a distributed
platform for battery measurements. It follows that fine grained
battery measurements (via a Monsoon High Voltage Power
Monitor [66] directly connected to the device’s battery) are
available for this device. Automation of the above operations
is realized via the Android Debugging Protocol (ADB) run
over wifi to avoid noise on the power measurements caused
by USB powering.
Execution time per operation. In Figure 9, we present the
average duration (and standard deviation as error-bars) of
each ZKSENSE’s operation, per device. As one can observe,
regardless of the device, bot detection is extremely fast, i.e.,
about 0.3 seconds. The cryptographic operations of hashing
and ZKP generation are instead more challenging operations,
lasting on a S9 device about 24 and 174.5 seconds, respec-
Figure 10: CPU utilization per operation. The ZKP gener-
ation is the most expensive operation, during which CPU
utilization gets higher than 20% for 25% of the operation
duration on a S9 device.
tively. While measuring the same operations on a cheap,
low end device like J3 we see that although detection takes
the same amount of time, hashing and ZKP generation take
respectively 7.8× and 3.57× more than previously in S9.
CPU utilization per operation. In Figure 10, we show the
CPU utilization per operation and device. Since no signifi-
cant difference was observed between the baseline and detec-
tion operation, we improve the figure visibility by reporting
only one boxplot representative of both operation. The figure
shows, overall, minimal CPU utilization associated with bot
detection9 and hashing operations. Even on the less powerful
J3, hashing only causes CPU peaks of about 30-40%. The
ZKP generation is by far the most expensive operation. While
easy to manage for the S9 device (e.g., CPU utilization higher
than 20% for only 25% of the operation duration, it can be
challenging for an entry level device like the J3 for which the
plot shows high CPU utilization (90% of higher).
Memory usage per operation. In Figure 11, we summa-
rize ZKSENSE’s memory usage as reported by procstats
tool over each hour of testing and more specifically we present
both USS (Unique Set Size - or in other words the total private
memory of an Android process), and PSS (Proportional Set
Size - where shared memory pages are divided by the number
of processes sharing them). Again, hashing and ZKP are
the most memory intensive operations with peaks of respec-
tively 200MB and 1 GB. PSS and USS are fairly close be-
cause of the (mostly) unique libraries adopted by ZKSENSE.
Battery consumption. Finally, we quantify the extra bat-
tery discharge (in mAh) associated with ZKSENSE’s key
9The non intuitive higher CPU usage at the S9 is due to the fact that this
is a personal device with some potential background noise.
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Samsung Galaxy J3
PSS USS
min avg max min avg max
Baseline 19MB 20MB 21MB 17MB 17MB 18MB
Detection 24MB 25MB 26MB 21MB 22MB 23MB
Hashing 97MB 132MB 218MB 95MB 129MB 215MB
ZKP 357MB 830MB 1.1GB 354MB 772MB 1.0GB
Samsung Galaxy S9
PSS USS
min avg max min avg max
Baseline 17MB 21MB 27MB 15MB 20MB 25MB
Detection 22MB 26MB 29MB 20MB 23MB 26MB
Hashing 25MB 148MB 267MB 25MB 145MB 265MB
ZKP 422MB 794MB 1.0GB 420MB 760MB 0.94GB
Figure 11: ZKSENSE’s memory usage. PSS and USS for
the different devices tested.
Figure 12: Energy consumption. Hashing and ZKP computa-
tion consume an extra 10 and 50mAh, respectively. For the
J3, this implies that each attestation in ZKSENSE costs an
overall of about 2% on the device’s battery (2,600 mAh).
operations. First, we compute the battery discharge of each
operation from the fine grain current and voltage measure-
ments reported by the power meter. Next, we derive the
additional battery discharge cause by each ZKSENSE’s oper-
ation by subtracting the baseline discharge from each specific
operation. In Figure 12, we plot the results. As expected from
the previous results, the battery overhead due to ZKSENSE’s
detection mechanism is negligible. Conversely, hashing and
ZKP computation consume an extra 10 and 50mAh, respec-
tively. On the J3’s battery (2,600 mAh), this implies that each
ZKSENSE’s validation cost about 2% of the device battery.
Note that this is a worst case operation, given the entry level
device. The lower duration and CPU utilization, coupled with
bigger batteries, make ZKSENSE less noticeable in term of
battery consumption on more powerful devices.
It is important to note, at this point, that ZKSENSE is
designed to perform bot detection asynchronously and not to
detract from the user experience. Nevertheless, it is wise to
schedule ZKSENSE’s operations depending on the device
state, e.g., skip when in power saving mode and prioritize
while the device is in charge. In addition, as discussed in
Section 2, utilizing ZK-STARKs instead of ZK-SNARKs for
the construction of the proofs can reduce the computation
overhead of the prover. Hence, we believe that a possible
mature ZK-STARKs library can improve the performance
of ZKSENSE. In Section 7, we describe further potential
performance optimizations of ZKSENSE and the scenario
of implementing real-time attestation of each and every user
action.
7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss potential extensions of ZKSENSE,
what other data sources can be leveraged and how one can
optimize performance and provide a real-time humanness
attestation of each and every user action.
7.1 ZKSENSE Extensions
As described in 4.1, in this paper, we build upon the obser-
vation that a human’s actions while visiting a web page or
an app trigger device motion. As a result, in ZKSENSE we
leverage two motion sensors of a mobile device: gyroscope
and accelerometer to assess the humanness of a performed
action. However, there are many more signals that can be
integrated in ZKSENSE in an attempt to not only increase the
accuracy (accelerometer and gyroscope alone achieve 91%
even in case of artificial device movement e.g., device docked
on a swing) but also enable reliable bot detection even in case
of more sophisticated bot attacks: via robotic arms [52], or
click farms with actual human workers [20, 61].
7.1.1 Ambient Light and Battery Sensor
Sensors capable of providing important features to the prov-
able classifier of ZKSENSE may include Ambient Light Sen-
sor (ALS) and battery status sensor [67]. Indeed, there are
already commercial products [1] exploiting data from these
sensors. In particular, the ambient light sensor, by detect-
ing the presence of ambient light through time can reveal
information regarding the position of the device: e.g., device
being always indoor, always under artificial light, which can
give strong indication regarding the general use of the mobile
device. What is more, data from battery status can reveal
information regarding the intensity of the mobile use: e.g., a
fast drained battery during specific time windows indicates in-
tense use by human, when user activity on an always charging
mobile device is a strong indication of automation.
It is apparent, that the exploitation of the above information
triggers severe privacy implications since it is capable to
reveal sensitive information about the device owner e.g., usage
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patterns, their daily working/idle schedule etc.Therefore, the
exploitation of such sources must be carefully designed to
always preserve the privacy of the user in order to be aligned
with the goals of ZKSENSE as described in Section 3.1.
7.1.2 GPS Sensor, Click Farms and Proof of Movement
While ZKSENSE can detect automation and ensure that the
device is being used by a human, it is still vulnerable against
malicious but true human clicks. Such malicious human clicks
one can find in the case of click farms where human workers
sitting in front of hundreds of decked devices and interact
with every one of them performing very specific and carefully
planed actions in order to pass the automation checks (e.g.,
CAPTCHAs). In this case, ZKSENSE fails because there is
not only a bot interacting with the device but an actual human
who passes the automation checks and then the bot can take
over to complete the fraud process.
A possible extension which could enable ZKSENSE to
mitigate such strong attack scenarios is the exploitation of
the mobile’s GPS sensor in order to prove to an auditor that
the device and the user are not static in a warehouse but
there is a portion of the conducted user activity that has been
performed in different geolocations. Of course, revealing such
information to other parties is very sensitive so the extension
must rely on a proof of movement without neither the moving
patterns nor the raw GPS coordinates to be revealed.
To address this, one could use geohash [68], a geocode
system which encodes a geographic location into a short string
of letters and digits, together with ZK-SNARKs. Geohash
provides hashes of nearby places that present similar prefixes,
i.e., if two locations are nearby, it is likely that the first letters
and digits of the encoding will coincide. This results in two
neighbouring GPS coordinates having a smaller hamming
distance than two distant coordinates. By using geohash and
ZK-SNARKs one can generate a zero knowledge proof of 2
points with hamming distance greater than m (where m is the
hamming distance equivalent of 4 kilometers for example).
This way, the device can prove to an auditor that: The user
has been in two points separated by more than 4 kilometers.
7.2 Performance Optimization and Real-time
Attestation
In Section 6, we assumed a scenario where the user’s ac-
tions gets attested asynchronously, the user gets a number of
blind tokens upon successful humanness verification which
he can consume later in order to get access to online ser-
vices. However, one would envision a real-time humanness
attestation mechanism, where bot detection will take place
synchronously on each and every user action.
In order for such an approach to be practical, architectural
support is needed to significantly decrease the execution time
of a ZK proof generation on mobile devices. Similar to the
hardware support provided by vendors in case of the Ten-
sorFlow library which can now run in the mobile device’s
GPU [87] or Intel’s Advanced Encryption Standard instruc-
tion set (AES-NI) hardware accelerator [54], the generation of
ZK proofs needs to be outsourced to a dedicated co-processor
in order for systems like ZKSENSE to provide real-time hu-
manness attestation to the user’s interactions.
8 Related Work
In this section, we present the existing works on: (i) mecha-
nisms related to bot detection, (ii) the privacy concerns while
using motion sensor data, (iii) the techniques that provide
privacy preserving and provable ML, and we put our work
into the context.
8.1 Bot Detection
To prevent automated programs, or bots, from abusing on-
line services, the widely adopted solution is to deploy a
CAPTCHA system. The early form of CAPTCHA typically
requires users to identify text from a distorted image.
However, text-based CAPTCHA schemes have been
proven to be insecure as machines achieved 99.8% success
rate in identifying distorted text [21, 37, 97]. Audio-based
CAPTCHAs have also been used to assist visually impaired
people, but they are difficult to solve, with over half of users
failed during their first attempt [86]. Therefore, CAPTCHA
service providers, such as Google, started to test image-based
CAPTCHA schemes, which require users to select images
that match given description [38]. Nevertheless, Sivakorn et
al. demonstrated that more than 70% of image-based Google
reCAPTCHA and Facebook image CAPTCHA can be effi-
ciently solved using deep learning [83, 101].
Walgampaya et al. designed a multi-level data fusion al-
gorithm, which combines scores from individual clicks to
generate more robust evidence, to detect click fraud [95]. Nev-
ertheless, these CAPTCHA systems require users to perform
additional tasks and deliver worse user experience, especially
when running on mobile devices [78]. To counter this, Google
reCAPTCHA v2 use a risk analysis engine to avoid interrupt-
ing users unnecessarily [39]. This engine collects and analy-
ses relevant data during click events to attest the humanness
of the user. The latest reCAPTCHA v3 no longer requires
users to click a button but instead it studies user interactions
within a webpage and gives a score that represents the likeli-
hood that a user is a human [40]. Although these CAPTCHA
schemes are invisible to users, a plethora of sensitive data,
including cookies, browser plugins, and all JavaScript objects,
is collected [57] that could be used to fingerprint the user’s
browser and link user’s online activities [49, 94].
With smartphones and IoT devices gaining popularity, more
bot detection schemes now focus on mobile devices, where
more types of embedded sensors are available. Most of these
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schemes require users to perform additional motion tasks. For
instance, Shrestha et al. showed that waving gestures could
be used to attest the intention of users [82]. Guerar et al. de-
signed a bot detection system that asks users to tilt their device
according to the description to prove they are human [46].
Hupperich et al. presented a movement-based CAPTCHA
scheme that requires users to perform certain gestures (e.g.,
hammering and fishing) using their device [53]. There are also
some studies focusing on designing an invisible CAPTCHA
scheme for the mobile. In particular, De Luca et al. exploited
touch screen data during screen unlocking to authenticate
users [28]. Guerar et al. suggested a brightness-based bot
prevention mechanism, BrightPass [47]. BrightPass random
generates a sequence of circles with different brightness when
typing a PIN; users will input misleading lie digits in circles
with low brightness. Buriro et al. proposed a behavioural-
based authentication scheme for banking apps, which uses
timing and device motion information during password typing
to identify genuine users [16].
The work that is most closely related to ours is the Invisible
CAPPCHA [45]. Similar to ZKSENSE, Invisible CAPPCHA
leveraged the different device acceleration appearing on a
finger touch and a software touch to make a decision about
whether a user is a bot. However, Invisible CAPPCHA only
considers simple tap and vibration events; its accuracy on
more complicated touch events (e.g., drag, long press, and
double tap) is unclear. In comparison, ZKSENSE considers
more types of touch events and works regardless of the de-
vice movement. To improve the accuracy, ZKSENSE uses
more data sources in addition to accelerometer and introduces
context into the detection.
8.2 Privacy Concerns of Motion Sensor Data
Previous studies have shown that motion sensor data could
expose sensitive information about a user. In particular,
TouchLogger [19], TapLogger [96], TapPrints [65], and AC-
Cessory [71] can infer user inputs on a touch screen an steal
user passwords based on the device acceleration data during
touch events. Mehrnezhad et al. demonstrated that similar
attacks can also be launched via Javascript [63]. In addition,
extensive studies have proven that user activity can be accu-
rately tracked from the motion data [77,80]. Other researchers
have also shown that personal user information, such as gen-
der, age, weight, and height can be leaked from the sensory
data [25, 62]. Most recently, Zhang et al. [100] revealed that
a globally unique device fingerprint can be generated from
the motion sensor data. These studies strongly motivate us to
design a privacy-preserving CAPTCHA scheme that does not
reveal any sensitive sensor data to the server.
8.3 Privacy Preserving and Provable ML
A potential approach to offer privacy preserving machine
learning is to evaluate the model locally, avoiding data to
be sent to the server. However, if, unlike ZKSENSE, such
approach is taken without proving correct evaluation of the
model [9, 48, 90], verification is lost. In these papers the
model is evaluated for targeted advertising, which can be ar-
gued that users are interested in evaluating the latter correctly,
removing like that the need of verifying the correct evaluation.
However, in other cases (such as bot detection) the user’s in-
terest might be of faking the evaluation model, and therefore
such limits open the gap for user attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only 2 papers aim-
ing to provide provable machine learning local evaluation
without a trusted execution environment. The first one by
Davidson et al. [27] tries to solve a similar problem, where
personalization of a user device is done by evaluating a model
locally on the user’s machine. This work uses Bayesian clas-
sification, for which they need from 100-300 feature words.
The generation of correct model evaluation for such range of
feature words ranges from 30 to 80 seconds. Moreover, this
study uses standard techniques for constructing zero knowl-
edge proofs, which give a big overhead to the verifier. For
our particular use case (where the verifier may need to handle
several requests simultaneously), such an overhead for the
verifier is not acceptable. The second one by Danezis et al.
[24] proposes a solution where after the evaluation of Random
Forest and Hidden Markov models, the user generates a zero
knowledge proof of correct evaluation. However, this paper
misses an evaluation study or availability of the code, which
makes a study of the scalability of their approach inaccessible.
Moreover, as in [27], the zero knowledge proofs give a big
overhead to the verifier.
9 Conclusion
Service providers need a reliable way to attest whether a client
is human or not and thus prevent user-side automation and
bots from abusing their services. Current solutions require
(i) either additional user actions (e.g., solve mathematical
quizzes or pattern recognition) like CAPTCHAs or (ii) user
behavioral data to be sent to the server, thus raising significant
privacy concerns.
In this paper, we propose ZKSENSE: a novel type of bot
detection scheme, which is both (i) frictionless for the user
and (ii) privacy-preserving. ZKSENSE leverages motion
sensor outputs during common user interactions (e.g., click
events) to identify bots and leverages zero knowledge (ZK)
proofs to guarantee the integrity of the result. We tested
our system under different bot scenarios: (i) when device is
resting (on a table), (ii) when there is artificial movement
from device’s vibration, (iii) when the device is docked on a
artificial movement generating swinging cradle, and it was
able to detect if an action was triggered by a bot or a human
with 91% accuracy. We believe that ZKSENSE presents a
viable alternative to CAPTCHAs on mobile devices.
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